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DAYS OF GRACE.

States X and l~ are at 'var. The 'var has broken out
suddenly. State X proclaims that it 'vill allo'v to vessels
of State Y "~ithin the ports of State X 48 hours in 'vhich
to load and depart. State Y protests that this is not a
reasonable dela~ defaveur, and that as State Y has allowed
14 days for vessels of State X to depart, the vessels of
State Y should be allo,ved a longer period than 48 hours,
and also states that if a longer period is not allo,ved the 14day period 'vill be reduced.
.
(a) Is 48 hours a reasonable period~
(b ) Has State Y the right to shorten the period already
proclaimed~

(c) Has State Y the right to 'vithdra'v all delai defaveur?
SOLUTION.

(a ) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a reasonable limjt for delai de faveur.
(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should
be allo,ved to shorten the period 'vhieh it has already
proclaimed to correspond 'vith the period granted by
State X.
(c) Under the conditions proposed in Situation III and
having regard to the preamble of the Hague Convention
on this subject, State Y has not the right to 'vithdraw all
delai de faveur, though in an extreme case it may adopt
the alternative of the Convention ·which requires enemy
vessels to depart "immediately."
NOTES.

Early provisions for days of grace.-Provision 'vas made
for days of grace in the treaty of Utrecht bet,veen Great
Britain and France in 1713.
27. On the contrary, it is agreed that whatever shall be
found to be laden by the subjects and inhabitants of either party, in
any ship belonging to the enemy of the other, and his subjects, the
ART .
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whole, although it be not of the sort of prohibited goods, may be confiscated, in the same manner as if it belonged to the enemy himself;
except those goods and merchandises as were put on board such ship
before the declaration of war, or even after such declaration, if so be it
were done within the time and_ limits following; that is to say, if they
were put on board such ship, in any port and place within the space of
six weeks after such declaration, within the bounds called The Naze
in Norway, and The Soundings; of two months, from The Soundings to
the city of Gibraltar; of ten weeks, in the :Mediterranean Sea; and 9f
eight months in any other country or place in the world; so that the
goods of the subjects of either prince, whe"ther they be of the nature of
such as are prohibited, or otherwise, which, as is aforesaid, were put on
board any ship belonging to an enemy before the war, or after the declaration of the same; within the time and limits abovesaid, shall no ways
be liable to confiscation, but shall well and truly be restored without
delay to the proprietors demanding the same; but so as that if the said
merchandises be contraband, it shall not be any ways lawful to carry
them afterwards to the ports belonging to (he enemy. (1 Chalmers Collection of Treaties, p. 407.)

Discussion of 1.906 .-Topic III of the International
La'v Topics discussed by the Naval \i\r ar College in 1906
'vas as follo,~v-s:
What regulations should be made in regard to the treatment of vessels
of one belligerent bound for or within the ports of the other belligerent
at the outbreak of war?

The conclusion 'vas stated in the follo,ving form:
1. Each State entering upon a war shall announce a date before which
enemy vessels bound for or within its ports at the outbreak of war shall
under ordinary conditions be allowed to enter, to discharge cargo, to
load cargo, and to depart, without liability to capture while sailing
directly to a permitted destination. If one belligerent State allows a
shorter period than the other, the other State may, as a matter of right,
reduce its period to correspond therewith.
2. Each belligerent State may make such regulations in regard to
sojourn, conduct, cargo, destination, and movements after departure
of the innocent enemy vessels as may be deemed necessary to protect
its military interests.
3. A private vessel suitable for warlike use, belonging to one belligerent and bound for or within the port of the other belligerent at the
outbreak of war, is liable to be detained unless the government of the
vessel's flag makes a satisfactory agreement that it shall not be put to
any warlike use, in which case it may be accorded the same treatment
as innocent enemy vessels._

The notes upon this topic, discussed in 1906, show the
early origin of some form of days of grace. The practice
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as to tin1e nllo,vecl enemy vessels to loaJ and depart has
varied . At the time of the Spanish-.American \Var of
1898 the United States allo,vecl 30 clays, Spain allo,vecl
5 days. 1\t the time of the Russo-Japanese \Varin 1904,
Russia allo,ved 48 hours and Japan allo,ved 10 clays. Six
'veeks "·ere allo"·ed in some instances, as during the
Crimean \var, and the Austro-Prussian \Var of 1866.
\Vhile 6 "reeks \Vere allo,ved for enemy merchant
vessels to load and depart in some of the \vars of the latter
half of the 19th century, only 30 days \Yere allo,ved to
Spanish vessels by the United States in 1898 and only
10 days by Japan to Russian vessels in 1904. The
United States regulations of 1898 \Vere held by the Suprenle Court to grant exemption fron1 capture to vessels
that had sailed prior to the beginning of the "rar.
Opinion of Prof. Takahashi.-Prof. Takahashi says:
It may be stated with confidence that the days of grace of one week 1
were sufficient for Russian ships to enjoy the full benefits of exemption, considering the nature of marine traffic, commercial interest
between Japan and Russia, as \Yell as the position of the commercial
ports in the Far East; consequently the one week's grace was adopted
by the experienced experts of the Japanese Navy. (International
Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese \Var, p. 66.)

Propositions as to delai de faveur at the Second Hague
Oonference.-There \Vere made at the Second Hague Conference various propositions in regard to the treatment
of merchant vessels of one belligerent in the ports of the
other belligerent at the outbreak of hostilities.
Russia:
Dans le cas ou un batiment de commerce d'un des belligerants serait
surpris par laguerre dans un port d'un autre belligerant, celui-ci doit
accorder a ce batin1ent un delai suffisant afin de lui permettre:
D'achever son dechargement, ou le chargement des marchandises
qui ne constituent pas de contrebande de guerre et de quitter librement le port et de gagner en securite le port le plus rapproche de son
pays d'origine ou un port neutre.
·

Netherlands:
Le delai sera fixe pour chaque port par les belligerants au commencement de laguerre; il ne pourra etre de moins que de cinq jours.
1 Seven days \Vere allowed after the date of the ordinance, ten from the beginning of
the war.
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This proposition 'vas further elaborated:
Les navires de commerce ressortissant aux Puissances belligerantes,
qui, a l'ouverture des hostilites, se trouveraient dans les ports ennemis,
pourront, a moins que leur chargement ne constitue de la contrebande
de guerr~, quitter librement le port et gagner en securite le port national
le plus rapproche ou un port neutre interpose.
Afin de leur permettre d'achever leur chargement ou leur dechargement, un delai suffisant, a fixer par les autorites locales, leur sera
accord e.

France:
Les navires de commerce ressortissant aux Puissances belligerantes
qui a l'ouverture des hostilites se trouveraient dans les ports ennemis,
et auxquels aucun delai de faveur ne serait accorde pour reprendre
la mer, ne peuvent etre confisques.
Toutefois la sortie du port peut leur etre refusee et ils sont alors
sujets a requisition, moyennant indemnite, conformement aux lois
·
terri tori ales en vigueur.

Dans le cas oi1 un batiment de commerce d'un des belligerants
serait surpris par la guerre dans un port d'un autre belligerant, il est
desirable que celui-ci accorde a ce batiment un delai de faveur afin
de lui permettre:
D'achever son dechargement, ou le chargement des marchandises
qui ne constituent pas de contrebande de guerre et de quitter librement le port et de gagner en securite le port le plus rapproche de son
pays d'origine ou un port neutre.

Discussion of delai de faveur at the Second Hague Conference.-The questionnaire submitted by Prof. :\iartens to
the Second Hague Conference in 1907 contained the
follo,ving:
IV. Est-il de bonne guerre, au moment de l'ouYerture des hostilites,
de saisir et de confisquer les navires marchands ennemis stationnes
dans les ports de l'un des Etats belligerants?
V. N e faut-il pas reconnaltre a ces navires le droit de quitter librement, dans un laps de temps determine, avec ou sans cargaison, les
ports de leur sejour au moment du commencement de la guerre?
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome. III, p. 1133.)

The Russian opinion upon the general question of
delai de faveur 'vas in part:
La pratique et la ~cience ont etabli la procedure ~UiYante , qui est
en usage depuis la guerre de Crimee. Un delai de faveur suffisant
doit etre accorde aux navires de commerce des belliRerants, pris a
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l'improYi~te pur la declaration de guerre dans un port ennemi. Ce
delai doit etre assez long pour permettre au navire d'achever son
dechargement ou le churgement des marchandises qui ne constituent
pas de contrebande de guerre, de quitter librement le port et de gagner,
avec toutes les garanties de securite, le port le plus rapproche de son
pays d'origine, ou n'importe quel autre port neutre.
De meme ne peuvent etre ni captures, ni confisques a titre de prises,
les navires de commerce de la nation ennemie, qui ont quitte un port
quelconque avant la declaration de guerre, et qui ignorent le commencement des hostilites, l'ouverture de celles-ci ayant eu lieu lorsqu'ils se trouvaient en pleine mer. (Ibid., p. 825.)

The instructions given June 12, 1907, to the British
delegation to the Second Hague Conference state:
It has been customary on the outbreak of hostilities for belligerents
to grant certain days of grace to enemy and neutral ships. In the view
of His :Majesty's Government the allowance of such an interval before
the strict rules of hostilities are enforced should, as indeed the term
"days of grace" implies, be treated purely as a matter of grace and
favor, and not as one of right, and they are of opinion that any fixed
rule on the point would be undesirable, as the circumstances of each
case must necessarily differ. It will be to the general interest of this
country to maintain the utmost liberty of action in this particular.
(Correspondence, Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers,
Misc. No. 1 (1908), p. 16.)

The British position 'vas thus stated:
Heureusement a l'heure actuelle il est d'usage

d'accorder un tel
delai aux navires de commerce, mais cet usage n'existe que depuis un
certain nombre d'annees. II y a de plus le fait incontestable que la
duree de ce delai~ accorde aux vaisseaux ennemis et neutres, varie
d'une fa~on considerable selon les circonstances.
Pendant plus d'une cinquantaine d'annees la Grande-Bretagne a
toujours accorde ce delai aux navires de commerce dans les cas ou elle
se trouvait belligerante. En outre elle contin\lera toujours dans cette
voie, a condition seulement que les operations militaires n'en soient
pas lesees d'une fa~on serieuse.
II est evident, cependant, que ce delai est accorde par faveur et
qu'il n'y existe aucun droit, et de notre maniE~re de voir il ne serait
jamais possible de formuler une loi internationale qui exigerait d'une
Puissance belligerante qu'elle accorde un delai de faveur a:l'ouverture
d 'une guerre sans aucune reserve.
De ce que vient de dire !'honorable Delegue qui a parle en dernier
lieu, il nous paralt evident qu'il serait impossible de formuler une
regie absolue qui donnerait pleine satisfaction a tout le monde en toutes
circonstances.
Un delai d'une telle duree qui satisferait les marines marchandes
de deux Puissances voisines, serait tout a fait insuffisant dans le cas
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ou les Puissances belligerantes se trouveraient dans de differents
hemispheres.
On doit encore envisager le cas d'une Puissance possedant des
colonies dans les mers lointaines. Un delai de quelques jours qui
pourra suffire pour les vaisseaux de commerce se trouvant dans ses
ports metropolitains, ne serait nullement suffisant pour ceux qui se
trouveraient dans les ports coloniaux.
De plus, et laissant de cote la question geographique, il y a encore
un argument non moins fort qui nous porte a demander que la limite
du delai ne soit pas fixee d'une fa~on absolue.
On peut imaginer le cas d'une guerre entre deux Puissances, l'une
possedant une marine marchande tres grande, et l'autre n'ayant pas
d'interet important dans le commerce sur mer.
La premiere fera son possible afin de prolonger la duree du delai,
la seconde, au contraire, voudra commencer aussitot que possible ses
operations contre la marine marchande de son ennemi.
Voila quelques facteurs du probleme qui nous est soumis. Pendant
que ces differences existent, et pendant que le droit de capture et de
blocus sont de regie, il nous parait raisonnable que chaque Puissance
se reserve le droit d'agir a ce sujet selon ses interets comme dans le
passe.
Neanmoins, nous estimons qu'un belligerant ne doit pas seulement
donner avis d'un blocus, mais qu'il doit en outre accorder aux vaisseaux neutres un delai convenable avant d'exercer ses pleins pouvoirs
contre eux.
Le Gouvernement britannique juge qu'il sera mieux de ne pas
etablir des regles fixes qui pourront limiter les droits d'un belligerant
a cet egard, ce qui n'implique nullement qu'on ne devra pas accorder
les delais de faveur comme regie generale.
Bien au contraire, mon Gouvernement a pleine intention d'adherer
a ce qu'il a fait dans le passe depuis plus de cinquante ans.
Dans le cas (qui j'espere n'arrivera jamais) ou la Grande-Bretagne
serait belligerante, elle accorderait aux vaisseaux marchands, tant
ennemis que neutres, un delai de faveur convenable, sous reserve
toujours que ce delai ne puisse compromettre ses interets nationaux.
En un mot, le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne s'associe aux
sentiments qui ont motive la proposition russe, maiA en meme temps
nous sommes d'opinion que le delai doit etre considere accorde comme
un privilege et nullement comme un droit. (Ibid., p. 827 .)

The Japanese delegate said:
Quoique le Japon ait toujours accorde un delai de faveur a tous les
navires et dans tous les ports, la Delegation japonaise estime neanmoins qu'a l'avenir il n'y aurait pas de raisons suffisantes pour traiter
les navires des belligerants qui, en temps de paix, sont subsidies par
le Gouvernement pour etre transformes en instruments de guerre
offensive, au trement que comme de contrebande mentionnes dans la
proposition des honorables Delegues de Russie. N ous pensons aussi
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que la Puissance belligerante doit avoir le droit de prendre les dispositions necessaires pour indiquer les ports ou le privilege en question
sera accorde, ainsi que les limites de la faveur qu'elle a !'intention de
donner, de fa9on qu'elle puisse accorder aux interesses plus de facilites
dans un port que dans un autre. N ous estimons ensuite que, des
stipulations conventionnelles seront etablies ace sujet, il est preferable
de fixer un delai bien determine que d'indiquer un delai dependant
de la duree du chargement et du dechargement de la cargaison, ce qui
femble etre un terme equivoque, puisque dans quelques ports ces
operations peuvent etre achevees dans deux ou trois jours et, dans
d'autres, elles peuvent durer des semaines et memes des mois.
En consequence, tout en acceptant le principe humanitaire qui est
enonce dans la proposition de la Delegation russe, nous nous rangeons
en meme temps a l'opinion de nos honorables collegues de la G:r:andeBretagne en l'interpretant comme un privilege accorde par la Puissance
belligerante, et non comme un droit qui pourrait etre invoque par
le vaisseau en question. (Ibid.,•p. 828.)

The course of the discussion is shO\Vll in the resume
given in the report of the fourth co1nmission, \vhich from
its significance may be stated fully:
La troisieme question inscrite au programme de la Quatrieme Commission est celle du "delai de faveur aaccorder aux vaisseaux pour quitter
les ports neutres ou les ports ennemis apres l'ouverture des hostilites."
C'est, comme on le sait, depuis laguerre de Crimee en 1854 que les
Etats belligerants ont pris !'habitude,· au debut des hostilites, au lieu
de confisquer les navires ennemis se trouvant ou entrant dans leurs
ports, de leur permettre la sortie et meme de leur accorder un certain
delai pour sortir en securite.
Le motif de cette mesure, actuellemetit toute facultative, est de
"'concilier les interets du commerce avec les necessites de laguerre"
et, meme a pres l'ouverture des hostilites "de proteger encore·, aussi largement que possible, les operations engagees de bonne foi et en cours
d'execution avant laguerre."
Cette question a ete soumise a l'examen de la Commission par notre
President, :\I. de :\Iartens, sous la forme suivante:
"Est-il de bonne guerre, au moment de l'ouverture des hostilites,
de saisir et de confisquer les navires marchands ennemis stationnes
dans les ports de l'un des Etats belligerants?"
"N e faut-il pas reconnaltre aces navires le droit de quitter librement,
dans un laps de temps determine, avec ou sans cargaison, les ports de
leur sejour au moment du commencement de laguerre?"
Quatre propositions ont ete deposees sur ce sujet:
La Delegation de Russie a propose de declarer desormais obligatoire
la concession d'un delai aux batiments de commerce relevant d'une
des Puissances belligerantes et surpris par la guerre dans les ports
ennemis, afin de leur permettre d'achever leurs operations commerciales inoffensives et de prendre librement lamer pour gagner en secu-
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rite leur port nationalle plus rapproche ou un port neutre . Le navire
qui, par suite de force majeure, n'aurait pu profiter de cette faculte, ne
pourrait etre con:fisque. La proposition russe ajoutait, par un motif
analogue, que le navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart avant
laguerre et surpris en mer par le commencement de laguerre, ne pourrait etre capture, qu'il pourrait seulement etre retenu et enfin que la
faveur de ces dispositions devait etre etendue egalement aux navires
entrant dans les ports ennemis.
A l'appui de cette proposition, la DelE~gation Imperiale a fait valoir
d'une part la necessite de sauvegarder, conformement a l'equite, les
operations de commerce engagees de bonne foi et en tou te confiance
avant la guerre et d'autre part la pratique universellement suivie
depuis 1854.
Quelque equitable qu'apparaisse le principe meme de cette mesure,
on n'a pas manquee toutefois de faire remarquer combien une regie
uniformement obligatoire etait pratiquement delicate a fixer et comment la consecration d'une obligation pourrait eventuellement Ieser
!'interet legitime des belligerants.
Les navires ennemis, qui se t1~ouvent dans les ports d'un belligerant,
peuvent, comme on l'a dit, etre des navires susceptibles de servir a la
guerre; il est difficile, peut-etre impossible, de toujours les distinguer
d'avance; peut-on alors obl'iger le belligerant alaisser, dans tousles cas,
sortir de ses ports les navires de commerce ennemis, quels qu'ils soient,
alors que la faculte de les retenir lui permet de priver son adversaire
de moyens d'attaque et de defense pouvant bientot etre utilises?
Pour ces raisons, la Delegation fran~aise a propose le maintien du
regime facultatif actuel. ~Iais, s'associant pleinement aux sentiments
d'equite exposes par la Russie, et au legitime souci des interets du
commerce international, exigeant de ne point tromper la confiance du
tra:fic engage en temps de paix, la Delegation de la Republique admettait que le navire auquella sortie serait refusee ne saurait etre confisque
et qu'il serait seulement sujet a requisition, moyennant indemnite,
comme toutes autres proprietes se trouvant sur le territoire du belligerant.
La Delegation neerlanclaise, tout en se declarant partisan de !'obligation, proposa un amenclement tendant a y apporter une exception
pour les navires susceptibles d'etre transformes en batiments de guerre.
Enfin la Delegation suedoise, dans un but de conciliation, proposa
de combiner les propositions russe et fran~aise, en se bornant aconsacrer
le caractere desirable de la concession d'un delai.
La discussion qui a eu lieu au sein de la Commission a ainsi principalement porte sur le caractere obligatoire ou facultatif de la mesw·e
en question.
Apres avoir constate qu'il y avait unanimite pour considerer la concession d'un delai tout au moins comme desirable, la Commission a
decide de ne voter qu'apres le travail du Comite d'Examen et elle a
pense qu'en vue de faciliter u·n accord, il convenait de charger ce
Comite de rediger un projet prenant en consideration la preoccupation
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relative aux navires de commerce susceptibles d'etre tran::5fonnes en
batiments de guerre.
C'est dans ces conditions que le Comite d'Exa1nen a procede a ses
deliberations.
L'accord n'ayant pu se faire sur le principe de I' obligation, le Comite
a pris comme base de discussion la proposition transactionnelle suedoise,
qui a abouti a un projet de reglement, dont voici l'economie, et qui,
sauf certaines reserves, a obtenu, devant la Commission, l'unanimite
moins deux abstent.ions. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de Ia
Paix, Tome I, p. 250.)

As a result of discussion there "\vas elaborated by the
drafting com1nittee the follo,ving rule:
Lorsqu'un navire de commerce relevant d'une des Puissances belligerantes se trouve au debut des hostilites dans un port ennemi, il est
desirable qu'il lui soit permis de sortir librement, immediatement ou
apres un delai suffisant, et de gagner directement, apres avoir ete muni
d'un laisser-passer, son port de destination ou tel autre port qui lui
sera designe.
·
II en est de meme du navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart
avant le commencement de Ia guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi
dans !'ignorance des hostilites.

The "\vord desirable is used to indicate the degree of
obligation resting upon the belligerent, as Great Britain
at the Conference \Vas particularly opposed to making the
grant of delay a duty of the belligerent.
The British delegation proposed the insertion of the
words de faveur after the "\Vord delai. (For the several
propositions see Deuxieme Conference Internationale de
la Paix, Tome III, pp. 1150-1154.)
Thus there "\vas evolved at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 a rule less stringent than the practice "\vhich
had been recognized by the United States as generally
obligatory.
The Convention relative to the Status of Enemy :Wierchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities according to
the introductory clause "\Vas agreed upon by States
"anxious to insure the security of international commerce against the surprises of "\var and "\Yishing, in
accordance "\vith modern practice, to protect as far as
possible operations undertaken in good faith and 1n
process of being carried out before the outbreak of
hostilities."
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Report of the American delegation.-The report of the
American delegation emphasized the grounds upon
which the attitude of the United States was maintained.
The uninterrupted practice of belligerent powers since the outbreak of the Crimean war has been to allow enemy merchant vessels
in their ports at the outbreak of hostilities to depart on their return voyages.
The same privilege has been accorded to enemy merchant vessels
which sailed before the outbreak of hostilities, to ·enter and depart from
a belligerent port without molestation on the homeward voyage. It
was therefore the view of the American delegation that the privilege
had acquired such international force as to place it in the category of
obligations. Such, indeed, was the view of a majority of the Conference, but as the delegation of Great Britain adhered to the opinion that
such free entry and departure was a matter of grace, or favor, and not
one of strict right, the articles regard it as a delay by way of favor and
refer to the practice as desirable.
In support of the American view the case of the Buena Ventura is in
point. This case was decided in 1899, and in his opinion Justice Peck:
ham says:
"It being plain that merchant vessels of the enemy carrying on innocent commercial enterprises at the time or just prior to the time when
hostilities between the two countries broke out would, in accordance
with the later practice of civilized nations, be the subject of liberal
treatment by the Executive, it is necessary when his proclamation has
been issued, which lays down rules for treatment of merchant vessels,
to put upon the words used therein the most liberal and extensive
interpretation of which they are capable; and where there are two or
more interpretations which possibly might be put upon the language
the one that will be most favorable to the belligerent party, in whose
favor the proclamation is issued, ought to be adopted.
"This is the doctrine of the English courts, as exemplified in The
Phcenix (Spink's Prize Cases, 1, 5) and The Argo (Id., p. 52). It is the
doctrine .which this court believes to be proper and correct. The
Buena Ventura (175 U. S., 388)."
At the first reading, the Convention seems to confer a privilege upon
enemy ships at the outbreak of war. Free entry and departure are
provided for, ships are not to be molested on their return voyages, and
a general immunity from capture is granted to vessels from their last port
of departure, whether hostile or neutral. But all these immunities
are conditioned upon ignorance of the existence of hostilities on the
part of the ship. This condition forms no part of the existing practice,
and it was the opinion of the delegation that it substantially neutralized
the apparent benefits of the treaty and puts merchant shipping in a
much less favorable situation than is accorded to it by the international
practice of the last fifty years ..
An enemy merchant v~ssel approaching a hostile port which is
notified by an armed cruiser, or which obtains the information under
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circumstances calculated to charge it with knowledge of the fact that
hostilities exist, forfeits the immunities conferred by the treaty and
becomes, eo instante, liable to capture. As the freight trade of the
world is carried on in steamers which habitually carry only enough
coal to reach their destination, the operation of the treaty is to render
them instantly liable to capture, the alternative being to continue to
t he hostile destination and surrender.
The Convention operates powerfully in favor of a State having a
predominant naYal force and possessed of numerous ports throughout
t he world so situated that a merchant Yessel carrying its flag may take
refuge in such ports on being notified that hostilities exist. All other
powers would be placed in a position of great disadvantage, and their
merchant marine would suffer incalculable injury as the result of its
adoption.
The effects upon the practice of marine insurance are also important.
The ordinary contract does not coYer a war risk. The operation of a
war risk is simple because its conditions and incidents are fully known.
But a policy calculated to cover the contingency of capture, the risk
depending upon the chance or possibility of notification, would introduce an element of uncertainty into marine risks which, in view of the
interests at stake, should not be encouraged.
The Convention also presents an undesirable alternative in the
treatment of enemy merchant ships, in that it provides that in certain
cases they may be seized "subject to restoration after the war without
indemnity," or to "immediate requisition with indemnity." As
merchant marine commerce is carried on it is obvious that the condition of the cargo which is detained in indifferent or inefficient custodianship during the ordinary duration of war would approach confiscation. It would also be substantially impossible to make such a risk
the subject of a practicable contract of insurance.
The foregoing ConYention was not signed by the delegation, and its
acceptanc.;e as a conYentional obligation is not recommended. (S. Doc.
~o. 444, GOth Cong., 1st sess., p. 38.)

'rhis IIague Convention, relative to the Status of
Enemy :Jierchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities
has not been adhered to by the United States.
Sumrnary.-\\"'"hether 48 hours is a reasonable period to
allo'v to belligerent Inerchant vessels to load and depart
'vill depend upon many circtnnstances. The relative
distance of the ene1ny ports fro1n one another, the nature
of the co1nmerce bet,veen the ports, the character of the
yessels, strategic reasons, and other circun1stances may
influent£' a state in deter1nining the nu1nber of days of
g TaC'(' .

CONCLUSIONS.
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The discussion at The Hague in 1907 sho\ved that th~
States \Vere not \villing to bind themselves to any fi.xed
period of delay to be allo\ved to merchant vessels in an
enemy port and that the rule as adopted did not determine
even that any period should be allo\ved, though it is asserted that it is desirable that a suffici~nt period bP
granted.
Prof. Higgins says of the rule of the Hague Conference
relating to the days of grace:
The practice of granting of days of grace remains therefore as it was
before the Conference. The powers have recognized its desirability,
but no merchant ship can demand it, nor will there be a legal ground of
complaint if all enemy merchant ships within a belligerent's ports at
the outbreak of war are ordered to leave immediately or after a "sufficient" period. \\Thether the expression "It is desirable" will be considered as equivalent to a command remains to be seen. States will
probably act in the future as they have acted in the past. Capt. Ottley
stated that the British Government had every intention of adhering to
the practice which it had observed during the past 50 years in granting
days of grace, subject always to the reservation that the time allowed
should not compromise its national interests. It was doubtless with a
similar mental reservation that the other powers accepted this article.
States will in the future as in the past consult their own interests in
this matter, but their interests may not infrequently involve a consideration for the interests of neutrals. Each State will determine for
itself whether the desire to injure its enemy by detaining his merchant
ships, which might be of the greatest value as auxiliary ships for the
fleet, will ''prevail over the fear of offending neutrals by causing a
great dislocation of trade in which some of them are sure to be interested." (The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 303.)

Conclusions (a) It 'vould seem from the current rules
and opinion that 48 hours might under certain circumstances be a sufficient period and under present rules State
X could properly limit the delai de faveur to a period of
48 hours.
(b) As the allo\vance of days of grace is a favor rather
than obligatory under present rules, a favor n1ay be
\vithdra\vn. Certainly a favor granted by one belligerent
to the other ought not to be taken advantage of to the
detriment of the belligerent granting the favor. In the
situation under consideration State Y should certainly
be allowed to shorten the period already proclaimed to
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corre::;ponJ \vith that granted by State X to the vessels
of State lr.
(c) 'fo \vithdra\v all delai de faveur \Vould involve the
good faith of Y, as the Yessels of State X had doubtless
governed their action by the proclamation of State Y.
To co1npel departure \vithin 48 hours \Vould be a hardship, but \Vould still allo\v the vessels to depart and
\Vould be an adequate measure· to meet the action of
State X in lin1iting the delai de faveur to 48 hours and
could be justified on the ground of retaliation.
To \vithdra\V all d{lai de faveur after once announcing
that delai \vould be allow·ed \Vould closely approach
perfidy, \vhich is generally regarded as prohibited in \var.
\Vhile it \Vould be possible for a State to refrain from
the grant of any specific delai de faveur, it \vould not be
justifiable for a State to proclaim a delai and later \vithdra\V all delai.
'"
·
State Y has not the right under the conditions stated
to ,vithdra\v all delai de faveur, but may in an
extreme case allo\v the vessels to depart freely but
"immediately."
SOLUTIOX.

(a) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a

reasonable limit for delai de faveur.
(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should
be allo,ved to shorten the period \vhich it has already
p; oclaimecl to correspond 'vith the period granted by
State X.
(c) Under the conditions proposed· in Situation III,
and having regard to the preamble of the Hague Convention on this subject, State Y has not the right to \vithdraw all delai de faveur, though in an extreme case it
1nay adopt the alternative of ·the Convention, \vhich
requires enemy vessels to depart "immediately."

